

CORE COMPETENCY OF THE U.S. ARMY RESERVE MILITARY  
INTELLIGENCE FORCE

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army  
Command and General Staff College in partial  
fulfillment of the requirements for the  
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE  
General Studies

by

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
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
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
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## ABSTRACT

CORE COMPETENCY OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE FORCE by MAJ Cathy D. Kennard, USAR, 104 pages.

The thesis examines the organization, roles, capabilities, and contributions of the U.S. Army Reserve Military Intelligence force. It investigates the perception that the individual Military Intelligence soldier--not Military Intelligence units--forms the core competency of the U.S. Army Reserve Military Intelligence force. It examines the U.S. Army Reserve Military Intelligence force in terms of size and composition, skills and training, and participation in contingency deployments and intelligence contributory support missions. It also examines the evolution of the U.S. Army Reserve Military Intelligence force and explains why the Modification Table of Organization and Equipment force dominates and ultimately affects the fate of the total U.S. Army Reserve Military Intelligence force.

The thesis concludes that the individual Military Intelligence soldier does form the core competency of the U.S. Army Reserve Military Intelligence force, but attributes that competency to associated unit structure. The study proposes that the U.S. Army Reserve Military Intelligence Modification Table of Organization and Equipment structure be realigned with the active component Military Intelligence structure or be eliminated in lieu of a more specialized Table of Distribution and Allowance structure.

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AC	Active Component
ADT	Active Duty for Training
AGR	Active/Guard Reserve
ARISC	Army Reserve Intelligence Support Center
ARMISE	Army Reserve Military Intelligence Support Element
ARNG	Army National Guard
AR-PERSCOM	Army Reserve Personnel Command
AT	Annual Training
CINCOS	Change in Noncommissioned Officer Structure
DA	Department of the Army
DIMA	Drilling Individual Mobilization Augmentee
DIRP	Defense Intelligence Reserve Program
DoD	Department of Defense
EAC	Echelons above Corps
FDU	Force Design Update
FRA	Fund Reimbursable Authority
FY	Fiscal Year
GDIP	General Defense Intelligence Program
ICS	Intelligence Contributory Support
IDT	Inactive Duty Training
IMA	Individual Mobilization Augmentee

IRR	Individual Ready Reserve
JMIP	Joint Military Intelligence Program
JRU	Joint Reserve Unit
MACOM	Major Army Command
MI	Military Intelligence
MID	Military Intelligence Detachment
MOS	Military Occupational Specialty
MOSQ	Military Occupational Specialty Qualification
MTOE	Modification Table of Organization and Equipment
MTW	Major Theater of War
NCO	Noncommissioned Officer
NGIC	National Ground Intelligence Center
NMS	National Military Strategy
OCAR	Office, Chief of Army Reserve
PCS	Peacetime Contributory Support
PERSO	Personnel System Staff Officer
RC MI FDU	Reserve Component Military Intelligence Force Design Update
RC	Reserve Component
RTU	Reinforcement Training Unit
TAA	Total Army Analysis
TDA	Table of Distribution and Allowances

TPU	Troop Program Unit
UIC	Unit Identification Code
USAR	United States Army Reserve
USARC	United States Army Reserve Command
VCSA	Vice Chief of Staff of the Army

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

#### Background

The U.S. Army Reserve Military Intelligence Corps is a force in turmoil. In the last ten years, it has lost approximately seventy percent of its unit structure and faces further losses in Total Army Analysis 2007. (Figure 1) Once stable and relatively peaceful--even through DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM--the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) Military Intelligence (MI) force has been rocked in the last five years by forcewide unit reorganizations, increased peacetime operational tempo, and Army Reserve space cuts dictated by the Quadrennial Defense Review.

#### Primary Question

The loss of spaces, the turmoil in the MI force, and the increasing use of individual MI soldiers to fill contingency requirements and peacetime contributory support operations have led to the perception that individual MI soldiers, not units, are the strength of the USAR MI force. This thesis proposes to confirm or dispel that perception. To do that, it asks the question: Is the core competency of the U.S. Army Reserve Military Intelligence force based in Troop Program Units or in individual support?

## Secondary Questions

To answer the primary question, the research methodology must answer a series of secondary questions. These questions focus the research and establish a set of criteria to be evaluated across all categories of the USAR MI force.

First, understanding how the USAR MI force has evolved over the last ten years establishes a critical baseline for the thesis research. How has the force changed in structure and strength, and what factors contributed to those changes? What was the impact of the Reserve Component Military Intelligence Force Design Update (RC MI FDU), the reorganization of the Military Intelligence Detachments (MIDs), and the creation of Joint Reserve units (JRUs)? How has increased operational tempo and the demands for intelligence contributory support affected the USAR MI force?

Also critical to establishing a baseline for the thesis research is understanding how the USAR MI force is currently organized and understanding what units and organizations it supports. How many categories across the Selected and Ready Reserve does the USAR MI force span, and what proportion of those categories are MI? What is the mission and purpose of each of the categories, and how does a particular USAR category impact the skills available, the level of training,

and the availability for employment or deployment of USAR MI soldiers?

From an evaluation criteria perspective, the thesis then asks what the USAR MI force is doing now. How and to whom does the USAR MI force provide intelligence contributory support and contingency operations support? How much of that support is performed by individual soldiers, and how much is performed by MI units? Are the units and organizations the USAR MI force supports in peacetime the same units and organizations it will support in wartime?

Also from an evaluation criteria perspective, how do individual MI skills and proficiency training impact the ability of the USAR MI force to support contingency operations, intelligence contributory support missions, and wartime missions? How much of the USAR MI force is duty qualified, and what are the shortage skills? What skills can the USAR school system train, and which skills can only be trained in active component (AC) schools?

Finally, in a transition to conclusions and recommendations, the thesis asks how the future force structure can support the core competency of the USAR MI force. What is the impact of Total Army Analysis (TAA) on the structured force, and what changes could affect the

individual force? Is it possible to structure a force capable of meeting both wartime and peacetime requirements?

### Definitions

#### Core Competency

For the purposes of this thesis, core competency refers to what the USAR MI force does best. It includes the specific military intelligence skills and organizational structure that most effectively supports the Total Army and the National Military Strategy. In this case, do individual USAR MI soldiers actually contribute more--provide more "value added"--to the Total Army, or do USAR MI units still fill a critical combat support role in Major Theater of War (MTW) operations?

When referring to the U.S. Army Reserve as a whole, core competency refers to types of USAR units that represent a significant portion (usually more than fifty percent) of the Total Army's capability in a given area. For example, ninety-seven percent of the Total Army's Civil Affairs units, eighty percent of the Medical Brigades, and sixty-nine percent of the Petroleum Supply Battalions are in the Army Reserve.<sup>1</sup> These units are all core competencies of the USAR. They are what the Army Reserve does best.



### Individual (IMA, DIMA, IRR)

Individual refers to Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs), Drilling Individual Mobilization Augmentees (DIMAs), or Individual Ready Reservists (IRR). The IMAs and DIMAs are assigned to mobilization billets of active Army, joint, or national level agencies. In accordance with AR 140-145, 23 November 1994, IMAs and DIMAs augment the "rapid expansion of the . . . wartime structure . . . in the event of military contingency, pre-mobilization, mobilization, sustainment and/or demobilization operations."<sup>2</sup> The IMAs and DIMAs are part of the Selected Reserve and are subject to immediate, involuntary mobilization. (Table 1, Figure 2) IRR soldiers are assigned directly to the Army Reserve Personnel Command (AR-PERSCOM) and constitute a ready manpower pool available for immediate, involuntary mobilization. (Table 1) The IMA, DIMA, and IRR soldiers are authorized a minimum of twelve days Annual Training per year, and Additional Duty for Training (ADT), subject to funding availability. (Table 1)

### Troop Program Unit

Troop Program Unit (TPU) refers to traditional USAR units organized under a Unit Identification Code (UIC), and documented on either a Modification Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) or a Table of Distribution and Authorization

(TDA). The MTOE units are built by proponent branches, and validated and resourced by the Total Army Analysis (TAA) process to support one or more Major Theater of War (MTW) threats.<sup>3</sup> The TDA units are documented at the Major Army Command (MACOM) level and resourced to augment specific peacetime and mobilization operations.<sup>4</sup> Because the TAA process does not validate TDA units, they are vulnerable to space reductions and are frequently the first structure to be cut or reduced. A third type of TPU, the Joint Reserve Unit (JRU) is a newly created unit, and is a hybrid, combining characteristics of both TPU and individual structure. The JRU is a traditional unit; it is organized as a TDA unit with a valid UIC; but the personnel in the unit are trained, managed, and mobilized by AR-PERSCOM as individual, IMA-like soldiers.<sup>5</sup>

#### Assumptions

This thesis assumes that the USAR recognizes the contributions of the military intelligence force--whether unit or individual--and will retain military intelligence assets in the force.

#### Limitations

A significant portion of this thesis relies upon raw data obtained from the Office, Chief Army Reserve (OCAR), the

U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC), and the Army Reserve Personnel Command (AR-PERSCOM). The degree to which the various directorates within those commands respond to requests for information may affect the depth of the analysis and the final conclusions of the thesis. Of particular concern is the availability and detail of data from AR-PERSCOM on IRR MI soldiers.

In later chapters, this thesis quantifies the total USAR MI force. It describes the force by mobilization category, by organization, and by total numbers. As a "snapshot in time," the quantification achieves the intent of the research methodology and fully supports the thesis question. However, at different points in the document, the thesis refers to two separate but confusingly similar sets of data. One set of data refers to the MI TPUs. The other set refers to MI soldiers in TPUs. Although the two sets of data are conveniently similar in total strength, they are very different in content. The MI TPUs are units that are organized under the MI branch Standard Requirements Code (SRC), SRC 34. All the spaces in those units are counted as MI spaces although a number of those spaces are not MI spaces. Most units, and in particular, MTOE units contain a significant number of administrative support spaces--

personnel, food service, logistics, and communications spaces. However, as a matter of standard practice, units are categorized by branch, and all spaces within those units are counted against that branch. MI soldiers in TPUs, on the other hand, refer to individual MI soldiers assigned to valid MI spaces anywhere in the USAR TPU structure. This includes soldiers in MI and non-MI TPUs. So, in counting the total USAR MI force, the final numbers and conclusions may vary based on which set of data was used.

#### Delimitations

This thesis will address only the core competency of the USAR MI force. It will not attempt to evaluate the competencies of either the Active Army or National Guard MI forces. Also, because the thesis addresses a contemporary and perishable issue, historical data will not extend prior to Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, and in most cases does not extend prior to the Reserve Component Military Intelligence Force Design Update of 1995 and Total Army Analysis 2005.

#### Significance of the Study

As stated previously, the core competency of the USAR MI force is a contemporary and perishable issue. It will have immediate significance for the resourcing phase of TAA-07,

and thereafter will have historical significance as a period-in-time analysis of the USAR MI force. The primary reason for completing this thesis is to focus the force integration staff at OCAR and USARC as they shape and resource the 2009 USAR MI force during Total Army Analysis. An objective analysis of the core competency of the USAR MI force will be an invaluable tool for determining what structure--MTOE, TDA, JRU, or IMA--to resource. More importantly, the thesis will consolidate and analyze data maintained separately in the various directorates and commands of the USAR and provide a statistically objective analysis of the competencies of the total USAR MI force.

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<sup>1</sup>Department of the Army, Office of Public Affairs, Policy and Liaison, "America's Army Reserve, Trained, Ready, Relevant, A 21st Century Force" [briefing on-line] (Washington DC: OCAR, 1997, accessed 10 January 1999); available from <http://www.army.mil/usar/stratcom/sld001.htm>.

<sup>2</sup>Department of the Army, Army Regulation 140-145, *Individual Mobilization Augmentation (IMA) Program*, (Washington, DC: GPO, 1994), 1.

<sup>3</sup>Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 100-11, *Force Integration*, (Washington, DC: GPO, 1998), 6-6, 6-7.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid*, 6-11, 6-12.

<sup>5</sup>Department of the Army, Draft Army Regulation XXX-XXX, *U.S. Army Reserve Support of Unified Commands Joint Reserve Unit (JRU) Program*, (Washington, DC: OCAR, 1998), 6,7.

## CHAPTER 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW

The turmoil in the USAR MI force is a contemporary issue. Although the problem has been growing for several years, the most dramatic changes in the force occurred only within the last two years. Published literature directly addressing this issue, therefore, is virtually nonexistent. The available literature that supports this thesis provides mostly historical and background information. The value of that literature is in its ability to trace the underlying concepts of the RC MI FDU and intelligence contributory support through the years and to demonstrate how DoD and national defense policies have actually supported it. The body of the thesis--the evaluation criteria and the analysis--relies on raw data derived from spreadsheets, charts, and briefing slides provided by the various directorates and staff offices of the U.S. Army Reserve Command, the Army Reserve Personnel Command, and the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve. Combined, the published literature and the raw data support the thesis conclusions and recommendations.

An excellent starting point for background information is *Twice the Citizen, A History of the United States Army*

Reserve, 1908-1983.<sup>1</sup> This book, which chronicles the creation and evolution of the U.S. Army Reserve, touches very briefly on the Military Intelligence force. In 1968, two Military Intelligence Detachments were mobilized in support of the Vietnam conflict and assigned to the Strategic Army Forces.<sup>2</sup> Fifteen years later, in 1983, the Strategic Military Intelligence Detachments were credited as a core competency of the USAR, with 100 percent of that structure in the Army Reserve.<sup>3</sup> Later chapters of this thesis will show that these small, specialized, and seemingly insignificant units have the greatest longevity and structural stability in the USAR MI force.

A more recent book, *Citizen Warriors, America's National Guard and Reserve Forces and the Politics of National Security*, by Stephen M. Duncan, addresses the Reserve Component through operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM and implementation of the all-volunteer total force. Mr. Duncan served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs under the Reagan and Bush administrations, and offers an insightful and candid assessment of the capabilities and limitations of this nation's reserve forces. Although he does not specifically address the USAR MI force, many of the ideas he proposes

impact the force. Mr. Duncan recognizes the "remarkable talent and experience that exists in the reserve component," and supports efforts by the "reserve components to move beyond a traditional wartime backup role and to provide peacetime support to active units."<sup>4</sup> In a summation of the book, he offers a list of fundamentals for integrating the reserve components into the total force. Several of those fundamentals have particular significance in support of this thesis: (1) "Reservists train as units and should normally be deployed as units."<sup>5</sup> (2) "Combat commanders must have access to individual skills."<sup>6</sup> (6) "Qualified reservists should not routinely be assigned 'backfill' missions."<sup>7</sup>

Perhaps the greatest utility of the published literature in support of this thesis is in its ability to show the genesis of a concept and then to trace that concept through time. This thesis contends that the RC MI FDU is the root cause of the turmoil in the USAR MI force. The basic concept of the RC MI FDU was to "leverage RC strengths to support peacetime, contingency, crisis, and wartime operations."<sup>8</sup> The literature review confirms that this idea was neither new nor exclusive to the USAR MI leadership. In fact, the idea of reorganizing the USAR MI



force grew out of the MI Force Design Update 95-1 and the MI RELOOK.<sup>9</sup> Although the primary source literature was not available for this thesis, the *U.S. Army Reserve Command Annual Command History, 1 January to 31 December 1995* documented the results of both the MI RELOOK Task Force and the subsequent RC MI RELOOK Committee.<sup>10</sup> This literature clearly shows that as early as 1991, the AC recognized the need to reorganize the USAR MI force.

The strength of this concept on the part of the AC is reinforced in published doctrine. In September 1994, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca released Field Manual (FM) 34-1, *Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations*. This manual proposed a new conceptual model for the intelligence force of the future. It moved intelligence operations away from the Cold War era model and established criteria for a new force projection intelligence force. These criteria required the intelligence force to be mission-based, downward focused, and capable of surging in times of crisis.<sup>11</sup> The force projection MI force would be tailored to respond to changing mission requirements and would be built of small, deployable teams.<sup>12</sup> These concepts flowed from the MI Force Design Update 95-1, the MI RELOOK Task Force, the RC MI

RELOOK Committee and formed the conceptual basis for the RC MI FDU.

Unfortunately for the USAR MI force, FM 34-1 did not develop the force projection model beyond its conceptual base, nor did it specifically address what role the USAR MI force would play in that model. Even more unfortunate for the USAR MI force was the failure of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca to validate the changing force--both AC and RC--with published, updated doctrine. The FM 34-1 has not been updated since September 1994, and of the remaining 34-series field manuals, only two have been updated since 1995.<sup>13</sup>

Equally disappointing is the absence of articles in the *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* (also published by the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca) addressing the USAR MI force in terms of either changing doctrine or changing structure. Sergeant Major Patricia Ann York wrote the only article in the past three years that has had any impact on the reserve force. The article, "Enlisted Issues: CINCOS," gives a comprehensive overview of the "change in NCO structure" mandated by the Army Chief of Staff on 2 July 1997.<sup>14</sup> The CINCOS shifted MI NCO grade structure, reducing the number of senior NCO

positions in favor of increased junior NCO positions. For the AC MI force, this change invigorated MI MOS career progression patterns; for the USAR MI force the change stunted career progression and caused more turmoil in the structure.

To this point, the literature has demonstrated that the RC MI FDU was not conceived in a vacuum. If the events documented in the literature led to the basic concept behind the RC MI FDU, the Secretary of Defense memorandum "Peacetime Use of Reserve Component Intelligence Elements" gave it validity. Published in October 1994, the memorandum presented a comprehensive implementation plan for the integration of the reserve military intelligence forces from all components into the AC, joint, and DoD intelligence systems.<sup>15</sup> The plan was based on three principles: (1) Peacetime engagement will enhance the wartime readiness of reserve intelligence forces, (2) reserve intelligence forces must fill the shortfalls created by a diminishing AC and civilian intelligence force, and (3) the reserve intelligence forces must become more visible, more accessible, and demonstrate greater utility as a force.<sup>16</sup> As a result of this memorandum the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence at the U.S. Army

Reserve Command created the Army Reserve Military Intelligence Support Element to manage the intelligence contributory support program.

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<sup>1</sup> Richard B. Crossland and James T. Currie, *Twice the Citizen, A History of the United States Army Reserve, 1908-1983* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1984).

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., 278.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., 301.

<sup>4</sup>Stephen M. Duncan, *Citizen Warriors, America's National Guard and Reserve Forces and the Politics of National Security* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1997), 211.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., 230.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., 232.

<sup>8</sup>Department of the Army, U.S. Army Reserve Command, Office of the Command Historian. *U.S. Army Reserve Command Annual History, 1 January to 31 December 1995* (Atlanta: USARC, 1997), 279.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid.

<sup>11</sup>Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 34-1, *Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1994), 1-3.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., 1-2.

<sup>13</sup>Department of the Army, U.S. Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, "'Legacy' Field Manual Production Status" [spreadsheet on-line] (Fort Huachuca, AZ: 1999, accessed 15 May 1999); available <http://138.27.35.36/doctrine/fm%20status.htm>.

<sup>14</sup>Patricia York, "Enlisted Issues: CINCOS," *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* (October-December 1997): 56-57.

<sup>15</sup>Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, "Peacetime Use of Reserve Component Intelligence Elements, Implementation Plan for Improving the Utilization of the Reserve Military Intelligence Force" (Washington, DC: 1994), 3.

<sup>16</sup>*Ibid.*, 3.

## CHAPTER 3

### RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

#### Introduction

The primary question of this thesis is based on the perception that individual USAR MI soldiers contribute more to the total Army than do USAR Military Intelligence units. This thesis seeks to confirm or dispel that perception. The methodology for achieving that goal applies a tiered approach to solving the primary question. Each tier drives the collection, evaluation, and analysis of the raw and published data needed to answer the question. The first tier establishes a baseline. It defines the USAR MI force and diagrams its structures, its strengths, and its missions. The first tier also sets the conditions for the research and analysis. It details the evolution of the USAR MI force, spotlighting the events that shaped the current force and the pressures that affect it today. From this first tier, the methodology builds a second tier based on evaluation criteria that can be applied equally across the USAR MI force and critically analyzed within the parameters of the first tier baseline. And finally, from the second tier analysis, the thesis draws conclusions and makes

recommendations to shape and support the future USAR MI force.

### The First Tier

#### Current Force

A critical first step in answering the thesis question is to determine what the USAR MI force looks like: What are its component parts, how is it organized, and most importantly, how large is it? The thesis problem is centered on space reductions and organizational turmoil in the USAR MI MTOE and TDA forces. These MTOE and TDA forces are traditional units; they are what most people think of when they think of a military force. Although they are also the most visible part of the force, these units are not the whole force. In fact, traditional units--troop program units--make up less than 50 percent of the total U.S. Army Reserve force.<sup>1</sup> The rest of the USAR force--the larger part of the USAR force--is an individual force. How many MI soldiers are in the individual force, and proportionally, how much of the USAR MI force is individual and how much is TPU based? Because this thesis seeks to evaluate the relative merits of individual soldier support versus unit support, answers to these questions are critical in

establishing a baseline from which the thesis question can be evaluated, analyzed, and ultimately answered.

### Background

Equally important in establishing a baseline from which to answer the thesis question is an understanding of how the USAR MI force evolved. This thesis is a direct result of turmoil in the TPU force, and most of the background, therefore, focuses on that force. The events and pressures that shaped the current TPU force also fostered the perception that the individual MI soldier is the strength of the USAR MI force. In evaluating the core competency of the USAR MI force, how have those events rather than the inherent strengths of the MI force affected the perception of competency? In this case, is perception reality?

Understanding how the current force was shaped not only provides insight into how to evaluate that force, but also provides a framework for drawing conclusions and making recommendations for the future force. In this case, the future is tied to the past. The background portion of this thesis explores reasons for the changes to the USAR MI force over time and highlights the differences and tensions between the MI proponents who build the structure and the force integrators who resource--or fail to resource--that



structure. The background also provides a framework for the analysis and conclusions. How will the pressures that created the current force affect the future force? And in drawing conclusions, how much will the pressures of the past and the present--peacetime support versus wartime readiness--affect the shape of the future force?

### The Second Tier

#### Evaluation and Analysis

At the heart of this thesis methodology is the identification and application of a standard set of evaluation criteria across all categories of the USAR MI force. This thesis divides the USAR MI force into five categories and establishes four evaluation criteria. The five USAR MI force categories encompass both the unit and the individual force. The MTOE and TDA categories represent traditional units; the JRUs are hybrid units, organized as TDAs, but managed as DIMAs; the IMAs and DIMAs represent the individual force, organized against MOBTDA's, but managed individually; and finally, the IRRs are a purely individual force and not associated with any organizational manning document. The evaluation criteria test all five USAR MI force categories from both a unit and an individual perspective. To answer the primary question of this thesis,

they seek to answer several secondary questions: (1) What units or organizations is the USAR MI force supposed to support, and who do they actually support? (2) What MI skills are the strongest in the USAR MI force, and what are the weakest? (3) How capable is the USAR MI force of training MI skills? and (4) How does the USAR MI force structure support the National Military Strategy?

### Support

The support evaluation criterion seeks to determine what units and organizations the USAR MI force actually supports. This is a peacetime criterion and is focused specifically on USAR MI support to contingency operations and to peacetime contributory support missions. Analysis of this criterion determines how much peacetime support is performed by units, by individual soldiers from units, and by individual soldiers from the individual force.

### Skills and Training

The skills and training criteria evaluate the military intelligence skills of the USAR MI force by grade and MOS. The skills criterion identifies the strengths and weaknesses of the USAR MI force in terms of critical military intelligence skills and most importantly, highlights deficiencies in the skills base. The training evaluation

criterion looks at the USAR military intelligence skills base from a different angle. It evaluates the capability of the USAR to train and sustain critical military intelligence skills. Specifically, it determines what skills the USAR is capable of training and what skills the USAR *actually* trains. And it too identifies deficiencies. Taken together, the skills and training criteria support and complement each other. They provide a key part of the answer to the *what the USAR MI force does best* question. But from a different perspective, they provide an even more critical answer to what the USAR MI force does not do best. That answer will play a central role in developing conclusions and recommendations for this thesis. Is the USAR resourcing a structure that it can neither fill nor train, and what is the trade-off, in terms of the National Military Strategy, in keeping an empty structure in the force?

#### Force Structure

The force structure evaluation criterion seeks to determine what organizations the USAR MI force is supposed to support. In other words, what is the wartrace or wartime alignment of the USAR MI force by category? This in turn determines proportionally how much of the USAR MI force supports Army warfighters and how much of it supports

nonwarfighters, to include national level agencies. This criterion does not directly answer the primary thesis question, but bridges the gap between the analysis--who is the force supposed to support?--and the conclusions--how well does the force structure support the National Military Strategy? It transitions the thesis methodology from criteria evaluation to analysis, conclusions, and recommendations.

### The Third Tier

#### Analysis, Conclusions, and Recommendations

An analysis of the first three evaluation criteria--support, skills, and training--answers the thesis question. But the analysis and incorporation of the fourth evaluation criterion--force structure--establishes the framework from which to draw conclusions and make recommendations. Almost as important as answering the thesis question is determining how well the core competency of the USAR MI force fits the current force structure. This portion of the thesis deals with realities, starting with the reality of what the USAR MI force does best and ending with the reality of how the total force is built and resourced.

At this point, the thesis methodology demands another set of questions and an understanding of the policies and

pressures that shape the force. First, how well does the core competency of the USAR MI force support the current force structure, and conversely, how well does the current force structure support the core competency? Next, how well does the current force structure fit TAA requirements, the intent of the National Military Strategy, and the mission and priorities of the U.S. Army Reserve as part of the total force? And finally, is the core competency of the USAR MI force a peacetime competency, and if so, how does it translate to the wartime force? In asking these questions, the thesis methodology does not propose to extend the original thesis question--core competency. It does seek, however, to establish a basis from which to determine how to maximize the core competency to support the total force, and hence to ensure the survival of the USAR MI force.

#### Weaknesses of the Methodology

The weakness of this methodology is that it does not evaluate units to the depth that it evaluates individual soldiers. The thesis question asks if the core competency of the USAR MI force is based in units or in individuals. The methodology seeks to answer that question by examining units versus individual soldiers from units versus individual soldiers from the individual force. The

research, however, focuses far more on individual soldiers--from units and from the individual force--than it does on units. The first three evaluation criteria--support, skills, and training--are individually focused. Only the last evaluation criterion--force structure--is unit focused. The methodology of this thesis evaluates the unit as an entity only in terms of its mobilization readiness, its wartime alignment, and the validity of its role in supporting the National Military Strategy.

Given this apparent weakness, the primary thesis question might well be rewritten to evaluate only individual soldiers as the core competency of the USAR MI force. But units as organizational entities are critical to the evaluation of the core competency for two reasons. First, unit structure may actually foster better-trained and more competent soldiers than the individual force. Typically, soldiers assigned to units get priority for training dollars and school seats over soldiers from the individual force. And second, units are the basic building blocks that the Total Army Analysis uses to support the National Military Strategy. Ultimately, the need to fill Total Army Analysis requirements may outweigh other considerations of core competency.

A second weakness of the methodology is the evaluation of the core competency of the USAR MI force as a peacetime competency. The first three evaluation criteria focus on what the force is doing best now, in peacetime, but does not consider the potential of that force to do equally well in wartime. Again, only the final evaluation criterion--force structure--focuses on a structure capable of meeting the wartime requirements of the National Military Strategy. Despite the validity of peacetime requirements, the Army and all its components is built and resourced to meet wartime threats. A peacetime competency must translate into wartime capability.

In both cases--the focus on the individual soldier and the focus on peacetime competency--the weaknesses are not fatal flaws. They are simply beyond the scope of this thesis and are both candidates for future research. Despite these weaknesses, the methodology does answer the primary question. The conclusions and recommendations will address the inconsistencies in the research.

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<sup>1</sup>Department of the Army, Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, Office of Public Affairs, Policy and Liaison, *America's Army Reserve: Trained, Ready, Relevant, A 21st Century Force* [briefing on-line] (Washington DC: 1997, accessed 10 January 1999) available from <http://www.army.mil/usar/stratcom/sld001.htm>.

## CHAPTER 4

### BACKGROUND

#### Mission and Composition of the USAR

The mission of the U.S. Army Reserve is fourfold. It provides "trained and ready combat support/combat service support units to rapidly mobilize and deploy"; it provides "trained and ready individual soldiers to augment the Army"; it supports "Army retirees/veterans"; and it projects "the Army anytime to anyplace to achieve victory."<sup>1</sup> To perform its mission, the USAR is organized into three categories: the Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve, and the Retired Reserve. Of those three categories, the Ready Reserve provides units and individuals to the Army and is therefore critical to this thesis. The Ready Reserve is further subdivided into the Selected Reserve and the Individual Ready Reserve. The Selected Reserve is composed of Troop Program Units (TPUs), the Active/Guard Reserve (AGR) force, and the Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) force. Under section 10143, Title 10, US Code, the Selected Reserve is essential to the wartime missions of the Active Army and has priority over all other reserve categories.<sup>2</sup>



Troop Program Units (TPUs) are the most visible part of the total USAR force. They are traditional units, predominately combat support and combat service support, and are organized under Modification Tables of Organization and Equipment (MTOEs) and Tables of Distribution and Allowance (TDAs). TPUs are subject to Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up (PSRC), either as entire units or as detachments. Soldiers assigned to TPUs are authorized 48 paid drills and 17 days Annual Training per year.

The Active/Guard Reserve (AGR) force provides full-time manning for the USAR. The AGRs are assigned against full-time support TDAs of USAR and AC units and joint and Department of Defense (DoD) organizations. They are tasked with the mission of "organizing, administering, recruiting and retaining, instructing, and training" USAR soldiers.<sup>3</sup>

The Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) force is composed of individual soldiers assigned against the Mobilization TDAs (MOBTDA) of AC, joint, and DoD agencies. The IMA force is subject to mobilization under a PSRC. Soldiers assigned as IMAs are authorized to perform twelve days of annual training per year. A selected number of IMA positions are considered critical for mobilization and are designated Drilling IMA (DIMA) positions. In addition to

twelve days of annual training per year, soldiers assigned to DIMA positions are also authorized to perform twenty-four to forty-eight drills per year.

Joint Reserve Units (JRUs) are new to the USAR and are hybrid units. They are organized against the MOBTDA's of joint organizations, but are documented as TDA units and counted against the end strength of the TPU force.

Personnel assigned to JRUs are managed as individual soldiers, and are authorized forty-eight drills and twelve days annual training per year. JRUs are subject to mobilization under a PSRC.

The Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) is an unassigned pool of individual manpower available for deployment under partial or full mobilization. The IRR soldiers cannot be mobilized under a PSRC.

The Individual Ready Reserve Augmentee (IRR-Aug) program is also new to the USAR. Under this program, a small number of IRR positions are documented against the Augmentation TDAs (AUGTDAs) of selected DoD agencies. IRR-Aug soldiers are managed similarly to IMA soldiers and are authorized twelve days annual training per year.

## The Unit versus the Individual Force

This thesis seeks to measure the differences between unit and individuals. For the purposes of this thesis, unit refers to the Troop Program Unit force, both MTOE and TDA. The individual force refers to all personnel managed by the Army Reserve Personnel Command (AR-PERSCOM). This includes IMA, DIMA, JRU, IRR, and IRR-Aug soldiers.

The TPU force fulfills the first mission of the USAR by providing trained and ready units capable of rapidly mobilizing and deploying. Troop Program Units are the backbone of the USAR, forming over 90 percent of the Selected Reserve and over 40 percent of the Ready Reserve. They are also the standard by which the USAR measures its core competencies--how much of total Army capability, by unit and type, resides in the USAR. Because of their mobilization mission, TPUs must maintain a higher mobilization readiness than other USAR categories. This translates into increased funding, ensuring more authorized training days, school seats, and active duty training days for soldiers assigned to TPUs.

The individual force fulfills the second mission of the USAR by providing individual soldiers to augment the Army. The individual force is "fillers," individual

soldiers centrally managed by the AR-PERSCOM and utilized to meet individual Army requirements. In its purest form, this individual force augments the Army through the unassigned pool of IRR soldiers. These soldiers fill Army requirements by rank and MOS and other specialized skills as requested. The remaining individual force--IMA, DIMA, JRU, and IRR-Aug soldiers--are already prepositioned against Army, Joint, and DoD requirements through mobilization or augmentation documents. These soldiers are assigned against organizational manning documents of active component units, agencies, and organizations. They are part of those organizations. In peacetime they augment the organizations by training with them using Annual Training, authorized drills, and additional funded active duty training. Upon mobilization, they integrate fully into those organizations.

Although the mission of the USAR is to provide individual soldiers to augment the Army, in the past few years that mission has expanded to include Joint and Department of Defense agencies. The mobilization TDAs of active Army, Joint, and DoD agencies are created and maintained by those organizations. They, not the USAR, identify which positions USAR soldiers should fill. The

only role the USAR plays in this process is determining how many of those positions to resource. The USAR does not determine requirements, it merely resources them.

#### The USAR MI Force

The USAR MI force, like every other branch present in the USAR, is spread across all Army Reserve categories. This distribution is not equitable, preplanned, or based on quotas. It is dependent on the wartime mobilization requirements of active Army, Joint, and DoD units, agencies, and organizations. The USAR MI force is both a TPU and an individual force. It consists of 4,109 TPU spaces, 38 percent of the total USAR MI force; 749 IMA spaces, 7 percent of the total USAR MI force; and 5,771 IRR spaces, 53 percent of the total USAR MI force (table 3).

#### Total Army Analysis

As the backbone of the USAR, the MTOE force is the most visible portion of the Army Reserve and frequently influences changes in the rest of the force. This is particularly true in the USAR MI force where the turmoil of the last few years has been almost exclusively MTOE TPU based. To understand how the USAR MI force evolved and the causes of the turmoil, it is necessary first to understand

how the Total Army Analysis (TAA) process drives MTOE structure.

The Total Army Analysis is an analytical, doctrine-based process. It generates the "below-the-line tactical support forces and the general purpose forces necessary to support the above-the-line divisional and nondivisional combat forces contained in the Army fiscally constrained force (divisions, separate brigades, special forces groups, and armored cavalry regiments)."<sup>4</sup> It is a two-year, two-phased process. In the requirements phase, the Army models DoD directed scenarios based on Defense Planning Guidance and The Army Plan, as well as the National Military Strategy, threat data, and resource constraints.<sup>5</sup> From this process comes the Army's below-the-line MTOE force. The resourcing phase distributes that force among the various components of the total Army--active component (COMPO 1), National Guard (COMPO 2), Army Reserve (COMPO 3), unresourced (COMPO 4), direct Host Nation Support (COMPO7), indirect Host Nation Support (COMPO 8), and the logistics civil augmentation program (COMPO 9).<sup>6</sup> The end result of TAA for the Army is the initial force for the next Program Objective Memorandum (POM).

For commanders and soldiers in the field, the results of TAA range from negligible to catastrophic. In most cases, TAA validates the existing force, resulting in little or no change to unit structure. In cases where TAA does not validate existing structure, that structure is eliminated from the force through programmed unit inactivations. In other cases, TAA validates structure that is not in the current force, resulting in programmed unit activations.

The Total Army Analysis is a complex and often confusing process. In simple terms, it is the process that properly structures the Army to successfully respond to major threats to the national security of the United States. Every two years, the Army reevaluates the threat and readjusts its structure accordingly. This is the Total Army Analysis, and this is what shapes the MTOE force.

In the last five years, the Total Army Analysis has had a significant impact on the USAR MI force. It has also contributed to the turmoil in the force. The USAR does not build the MTOE structure. The branch proponent does. For most branches, that proponent is the "school house." The MI force, however, has two MTOE proponents. The "school house," the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca

(USAICFH) develops doctrine and builds the MTOE structure for the Corps and below force. The Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) develops doctrine and builds the MTOE structure for the echelons above corps (EAC) force. The USAR MI structure stays in the force only if the Total Army Analysis validates it as warfighter support for major theater of war (MTW) threats. The structure does not stay in the force because an active component unit says it needs it, nor does it stay in the force because a Joint or DoD agency that it works for on the side says it needs it. It stays in the force because TAA says it needs the structure as part of a total Army force designed to counter a major theater of war threat.

The requirements phase validates structure through allocation rules. Allocation rules are quantitative rules that tie structure together by echelon, workload, or unique relationships. For example, an allocation rule for a Force Projection Brigade (EAC) is one per Major Theater of War. Since the National Military Strategy designates two nearly simultaneous MTW, the allocation rule generates two Power Projection Brigades. The resourcing phase then allocates component resourcing for those Brigades. In this case, both Power Projection Brigades were allocated to the active



component. In another example, the allocation rule for the Tactical Exploitation Battalion (TEB) is one per Corps. If TAA models four corps, the allocation rule will generate four Tactical Exploitation Battalions.

As stated previously, the Total Army Analysis generates army-wide requirements and then allocates the structure generated by those requirements to specific components. In this way, a validated structure--the same structure--may be resourced in the AC, the ARNG, and the USAR simultaneously. TAA does not generate component specific structure; it generates Army specific structure.

#### Evolution of the USAR MI Force

##### MI RELOOK

In 1991, the DA Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DA DCSINT) and the DA Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DA DCSOPS) initiated a review of the Army Military Intelligence force. As the MI proponent, the Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, took the lead in this review and formed a MI RELOOK task force. In August 1991, the task force concluded their review with a briefing to a General Officer Steering Committee. The task force identified nine primary issues. The fifth issue addressed the Reserve Component: "RC MI

structure/strategy [was] inadequate to support projected Army requirements.'"<sup>7</sup> As a result of that briefing, a RC MI RELOOK committee was formed to address the Reserve Component issues. Between August 1991 and August 1992, the committee studied the eleven subissues associated with the original "fifth issue" identified by the MI RELOOK task force. (One of those subissues was the Military Intelligence Detachments, and in response, the committee proposed a reorganization plan. This issue will be addressed later in the thesis, but is mentioned here to provide an historical context for later discussion.) In August 1992, the RC MI RELOOK committee recommended that the RC MI force "develop a single, coherent force design and stationing strategy" for echelons corps and above.<sup>8</sup> In making this recommendation, the committee established ten criteria for a new RC MI force.

The Reserve Component Military Intelligence Force Design Update (RC MI FDU) grew from the recommendations of the RC MI RELOOK committee and the ten criteria listed above. Before discussing the RC MI FDU, however, it is necessary to highlight several points from the force design criteria for future discussion. First, the criteria listed above have survived the turmoil of the years. They appear

today in USAR MI policy documents and correspondence and have shaped the mindset of the USAR MI force. Second, the force design criteria represent an evolutionary departure from how branch proponents view and manage their forces. Typically, branch proponents design doctrine and structure for the branch as a whole. The different components in the branch share the same structure and operate by the same doctrine. That is how TAA validates and resources force requirements. But the MI branch, in recommending a separate force design for the reserve components, split the branch into two separate and distinct parts--AC and RC. By recommending AC and RC forces be interoperable rather than interchangeable, it suggested that the RC force could be different from the AC force. In its willingness to "capitalize on the readiness and talents of the RC MI soldier," the MI branch shifted focus from MI units to MI soldiers.<sup>9</sup> And in acknowledging the utility of RC support to peacetime, contingency, and crisis operations, it expanded the potential employment of the new structure well beyond the goal of Total Army Analysis to build structure to support wartime requirements. The recommended criteria were progressive and realistic in their approach to the unique capabilities and limitations of the RC force.

Unfortunately, in recommending a separate RC structure, the MI branch did not fully consider the consequences of trying to validate a double structure--AC and RC--through the Total Army Analysis process.

#### The RC MI Force Design Update

The RC MI FDU is the single most significant event in the history of the USAR MI force. The RC MI FDU was a USAR specific force design update. Using the criteria established by the RC MI RELOOK, the RC MI FDU designed a completely new USAR MI force. It also designed a separate force. The concept behind this new force design was to create a USAR unique structure which was easily accessible to the active component and capable of providing USAR MI skills in support of not only wartime MI missions, but also peacetime and contingency operations.

This new USAR MI force was designed to support echelons corps and above. It was aligned to the Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), the MI proponent for echelons above corps (EAC), and would be subordinate to INSCOM's two Power Projection Brigades (East and West). The basic building block for this new structure was not units, but small cellular teams. Each of these teams had their own derivative unit identification code

(UIC), giving them a "plug-in/plug-out" capability for rapid, easily accessible deployability. Now, when the AC needed only certain parts of a USAR MI unit--an imagery team here, a counterintelligence cell there--it did not have to mobilize the entire unit for only a few specific skills. It merely had to mobilize the teams it needed using the derivative Unit Identification Codes (UICs) of those teams. These cellular teams were cobbled together to create USAR MI units with a valid "AA" UIC. These units, then, were aligned against MTW east or west and assigned to the Power Projection Brigade responsible for that MTW.

On 22 May 95, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (VCSA) approved the RC MI FDU.<sup>10</sup> Based on this approval, the USAR MI community documented and programmed the new structure for activation. The transition to the RC MI FDU structure required a programmed inactivation of the existing TAA validated structure and a commensurate programmed activation of the new structure. In terms of units, this action involved the inactivation of five Tactical Exploitation (TE) Battalions, three Counterintelligence (CI) Companies, four Interrogation and Exploitation (I&E) Companies, and one Target Exploitation (TAREX) Detachment.<sup>11</sup> In place of those units, the USAR

programmed activation of the new RC MI FDU structure, which consisted of two MI Groups, two Corps Support Battalions, and three Theater Support Battalions. These inactivations and activations were carefully coordinated to reduce turmoil in the field and to retain the existing USAR MI force. In most cases activating units were collocated with inactivating units to absorb personnel and equipment, and inactivation and activation dates were programmed sequentially, one day apart. The new RC MI FDU structure went into carrier status on 16 September 1996, and activated on 16 September 1997. The old structure inactivated on 15 September 1997.

Total Army Analysis 2003 and 2005  
and the Quadrennial Defense Review

The approval and activation of the RC MI FDU structure was an out-of-cycle event. Although the new structure was vetted modularly against TAA-01 structure and adjusted to conform to TAA-03 structure, the Total Army Analysis process never validated it. It was waived through TAA-03 solely on the authority of the VCSA's approval. At the time, the VCSA's approval was all the validation the RC MI FDU structure needed. Over time, however, as the key players in the process moved on--transferred to other jobs or retired--and a new set of players picked up

responsibility for the force and the process, the validity of that approval weakened. The Total Army Analysis process models the future force against current doctrine and the structure built to support that doctrine. In the time between the approval of the RC MI FDU force and TAA-05, the MI proponent did not develop doctrine to support the RC MI FDU structure. Existing MI doctrine supported the active component force; it did not support the new, separate, and distinctly different reserve force. And the VCSA's approval was never officially documented in a formal memorandum bearing a signature and a directive to implement the structure. The only proof the USAR MI force has today of the VCSA's approval is a memorandum written by a staff officer documenting the results of the meeting in which the RC MI FDU was briefed. During the requirements phase of TAA-05, the new RC MI FDU structure expanded the total MI force by approximately 2,500 spaces.<sup>12</sup> When the USAR inactivated the five Tactical Exploitation Battalions, the three Counterintelligence Companies, the four Interrogation and Exploitation Companies, and the Target Exploitation Detachment, it did not eliminate the TAA requirement for that structure, it merely ceased to resource it. For the purposes of the

Total Army Analysis process, the RC MI FDU structure did not replace the existing structure, but added new structure to the total MI force. In earlier TAAs, the expansion of the MI force would not have made a difference. However, concurrent with TAA-05, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) directed significant force cuts across all components of the Army. The DA MI Organizational Integrator (OI) reviewed the total MI force and moved that portion of the force that was unsupported by doctrine into the "unique" category. "Unique" in TAA-05 terms meant structure that was relevant, but not directly tied to the TAA warfight. This move relieved pressure from the MI force at the DA level, but raised a red flag to the USAR leadership who were struggling with their own QDR directed force cuts. Since the preponderance of this unique MI force was USAR, the USAR leadership determined that the MI force was overstructured and directed a 1,700 space cut. Although most of the unique MI USAR force was originally the RC MI FDU structure, creative force realignment and negotiation ultimately resulted in a 1,200 space cut, using empty language structure and unique C2 structure. To the USAR MI force in the field, this resulted in further turmoil.



The MI Groups that activated in September 1997 were programmed for inactivation in Fiscal Year 2000 (FY00), and the five linguist battalions that also activated in September 1997 were programmed for inactivation in FY00 and replaced by eight linguist companies, which were programmed to activate in FY00.

Reorganization of the Military Intelligence Detachments  
and Creation of the Joint Reserve Units

Military Intelligence Detachments (MIDs) are the oldest continuous structure in the USAR MI force. They were formed near the end of World War II as small, specialized intelligence units and were associated originally with research departments of selected universities throughout the United States. Over the years, the number of the MID(S) grew to 59 units performing specialized intelligence missions for Army, Joint, and DoD organizations. The size of a MID(S) was and still is nine soldiers, then commanded by a Colonel, now commanded by either a Colonel or a Lieutenant Colonel. Until TAA-03, MID(S) were MTOE organizations. TAA-03 eliminated the requirement for the MID(S), and in order to save the units, the USAR elected to convert them to TDA organizations. The date of the conversion was delayed so the DA DCSINT could complete the reorganization plan directed by the RC MI

RELOOK Committee. In its final form, the MID(S) reorganization plan retained the same strength and essentially the same structure as the original MID(S) structure. The one significant change involved elimination of over one-half of the Colonel commanders and replacement with Lieutenant Colonel commanders. At the time of the projected conversion from MTOE to TDA, sixteen MID(S) were aligned to the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC), twenty-one were aligned to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the remaining twenty-two were aligned to the Unified Commands. The MID(S) reorganization plan addressed only the NGIC and DIA MID(S). The remaining twenty-two MID(S) were inactivated, and their spaces used to form the new Joint Reserve Units (JRUs). The NGIC and DIA MID(S) were converted in place; neither the unit location nor the assigned soldiers were affected. Although the new JRUs retained the Unified Command support focus, the structure and the locations of the units changed to meet the unique requirements of the supported Joint Command. This conversion effectively eliminated the jobs of 198 MI TPU soldiers and transferred them to soldiers formerly assigned to IMA positions of the Joint Commands.

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<sup>1</sup>U.S. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, "America's Army Reserve: Trained, Ready, Relevant Throughout the Full Spectrum of Military Operations" (briefing slides, Washington, DC: OCAR, 1998), 8.

<sup>2</sup>Army Command and General Staff College, C400, *Resource Planning and Force Management* (Ft. Leavenworth: GPO, 1988), 7-3.

<sup>3</sup>Department of the Army, Army Regulation 135-2, *Full-Time Support Program* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1980), 9-f(2).

<sup>4</sup>Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-11, *Force Integration* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1988), 6-6.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid.

<sup>6</sup>U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, C400, *Resource Planning and Force Management*, (Ft. Leavenworth: GPO, 1988), 6-7.

<sup>7</sup>Report with enclosure (Draft Concept Plan, Intelligence and Security Command, DA; Force Design and Stationing Concept, 18 Oct 93), referenced in U.S. Department of the Army, U.S. Army Reserve Command, Office of the Command Historian, *U.S. Army Reserve Command Annual Command History 1 January to 31 December 1995* (Atlanta, GA: GPO, 1997), 278.

<sup>8</sup>Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, "Force Design and Stationing Concept" (briefing slides, Washington, DC: DAMI-RA, 1993), 3.

<sup>9</sup>Report w/enclosure (Draft Concept Plan, Intelligence and Security Command, DA; Force Design and Stationing Concept, 18 Oct 93), referenced in U.S. Department of the Army, U.S. Army Reserve Command, Office of the Command Historian, *U.S. Army Reserve Command Annual Command History 1 January to 31 December 1995* (Atlanta, GA: GPO, 1997), 279.

<sup>10</sup>Department of the Army, Memorandum for Record (Washington, DC: VCSA, 1995).

<sup>11</sup>Report w/enclosure (Draft Concept Plan, Intelligence and Security Command, DA; Force Design and Stationing Concept, 18 Oct 93), referenced in U.S. Department of the Army, U.S. Army Reserve Command, Office of the Command Historian, *U.S. Army Reserve Command Annual Command History 1 January to 31 December 1995* (Atlanta, GA: GPO, 1997), 280-281.

<sup>12</sup>Amy McBurnie, "RC Force Structure," e-mail to author, 23 March 1999.

## CHAPTER 5

### ANALYSIS

#### Skills and Training

The ability of the USAR MI force to support intelligence contributory support missions and contingency deployments depends on its authorized and assigned strength, its MOS qualification levels, and its ability to train and retain critical military intelligence skills. To evaluate the skills and training of the USAR MI force across the Ready Reserve force, it is critical first to understand proportionally how large the USAR MI force really is, and how it compares to the total USAR force. The USAR MI force comprises only three percent of the total USAR Ready Reserve force and only two percent of each of the Ready Reserve categories except IMA, which is eleven percent.<sup>1</sup> As a branch, therefore, Military Intelligence occupies a seemingly small niche in the USAR force. Its size, however, is proportional to the total Military Intelligence force, which comprises three percent of the Total Army.<sup>2</sup>

This thesis evaluates authorized and assigned strength and Military Occupational Specialty Qualification (MOSQ) using information provided by the MI Personnel System Staff

Officer (PERSSO) at the Office, Chief of Army Reserve (OCAR). This information is a compilation of data derived from five separate USAR personnel reporting systems, and represents the most comprehensive "snapshot in time" of the total USAR and MI force.<sup>3</sup> The way in which some of the data is reported, however, limits a full evaluation of the USAR MI force across all categories. First, the data divides the force into four categories--TPU, AGR, IMA, and IRR--and compares it to the total USAR force. The TPU category provides authorized, assigned, and qualification data on MI spaces and soldiers found in all USAR TPUs, rather than in only MI TPUs. This provides a broader view of the TPU based MI force than originally intended, and also provides a convenient baseline against which to compare the MI MTOE TPU force. For the purposes of this thesis, the AGR category is a subset of the TPU category and will not be evaluated as a separate category. The IMA category includes the IMA, DIMA, and JRU forces and the IRR category includes the IRR-Aug forces. Although the IMA force is capped at a predetermined endstrength, neither the IMA nor the IRR forces are capped internally by branch. This means that the assigned strengths in these categories will always equal the authorized strength and that DMOSQ will always be

100 percent. For the purposes of these particular evaluation criteria, the utility of the IMA and IRR categories is in assigned strength comparisons by MOS. That leaves the MI TPU force as the only category in which a full evaluation is possible.

The USAR MI force has an assigned strength of 10,636 soldiers, 101 percent of its authorized strength. The TPU MI force, with an assigned strength of 4,183 soldiers, has 102 percent of its authorized strength. As a branch, the USAR MI force exceeds the average assigned strength of the USAR Ready Reserve force (figure 3). Within the branch, an anomaly in officer authorized strength stands out in the IMA category, where seventy percent of the authorized and assigned strength are commissioned officers. This trend is repeated to a lesser degree in the TPU force, where subtracting the MTOE force leaves a slightly higher officer ratio. This is consistent with the structure of MI TDA units, which tend to be small, specialized, and top heavy with officers and senior NCOs. Similarly, most MI IMA positions also tend to be rank heavy, requiring field grade officers and senior NCOs over junior officers and enlisted soldiers.

Although the USAR MI force covers the spectrum of Military Intelligence skills, it dominates in certain areas. Across all categories--TPU, AGR, IMA, and IRR--two specialties stand out in terms of both authorized and assigned strength: 35D, All Source Intelligence Officer, and 96B, Intelligence Analyst. Together, these two skills represent 40 percent of the total USAR MI force. Secondary skills across the force include 35B, Strategic Intelligence Officer, 96D, Imagery Analyst, 97B, Counterintelligence Agent, 97E, Interrogator, and 97L, Translator/Interpreter. Taken together, these primary and secondary skills define the potential competency of the USAR MI force and reflect the increasing individual requirements of the AC and DoD intelligence communities.

#### Training

Training and maintaining MI MOS proficiency in the Army Reserve is a constant challenge. The turmoil in the MTOE force and the increased operational tempo of contingency deployments has put an enormous strain on the ability of the USAR to maintain MOS qualification. This is particularly true in the MI TPU enlisted force where increased attrition requires constant retraining and reclassification as qualified soldiers leave and



unqualified soldiers take their places. The USAR replenishes the force through recruitment--both enlisting soldiers and qualifying them through initial active duty training and reenlisting soldiers into the Army Reserve as they leave active duty. A third option involves retraining and reclassifying soldiers through accredited MOS producing USAR schools. This option gives the USAR MI force the leverage to shift and retrain skills internally to meet changing requirements.

Of the thirty-five MI MOSes in the USAR MI force, the Army Reserve is capable of training twelve of those skills in FY99. With the exception of the signals, voice, and electronic intelligence MOSes, all are high density MOSes and are one of the primary or secondary skills mentioned previously.

As a leverage to raise or maintain MOSQ in critical, high-density skills, USAR MI schools are viable options. Although it takes longer to qualify soldiers through USAR schools, the two-week incremented training allows soldiers to balance their civilian jobs with their military training. In the last few years, however, USAR MI schools have been plagued with low student enrollment rates and instructor shortages. The continued low MOSQ levels in

skills they have trained in the last three years indicate that the USAR MI schools are not effective in raising MOSQ. The low student enrollment rates account in part for the low MOSQ levels. A likely contributor to the problem is persistent, higher than normal attrition rates in USAR MI enlisted MOSes in the last two years.

### Support

As an evaluation criterion, support addresses what the USAR MI force is doing now. It examines the form and extent of USAR MI contingency deployments in support of operations in Bosnia and the form and extent of USAR MI Intelligence Contributory Support (ICS).

### Contingency Deployments

To date, USAR support to contingency operations in Bosnia has involved the deployment of approximately 14,691 soldiers from over 382 units.<sup>4</sup> Most of these deployments have been the result of mobilizations under the Presidential Selected Reserve Callup (PSRC) and very few have involved the mobilization of entire USAR units. In most cases, portions of units have been mobilized as derivative detachments in order to extract specific skills needed to support operations in theater.

In the USAR MI force, unit derivatizations have been the norm. From the initial increment in 1996 to the present, approximately 698 USAR MI soldiers have deployed in support of the Bosnia operations. Of those soldiers, only thirty-two were not from MI troop units. This means that MI TPU soldiers have carried the burden through seven deployment increments, from 1996 to 1999.

What is unique about USAR MI support to the Bosnia operations are the requirements and the deployment location. From the very beginning, Military Intelligence support has always been requested in the form of individual requirements--a shopping list by grade and MOS. The active component has never requested MI units or modular teams from MI units. And more importantly, 99 percent of USAR MI support has not been for in-theater support. Almost all of the 698 MI soldiers deployed in support of Bosnia operations actually deployed to Germany to backfill AC soldiers going into "the box."

During the first two deployment increments, the USAR attempted unit mobilizations to extract the required skills and grades. After the second increment, however, available skills and grades were exhausted, and the USAR was forced to do very small, multiple derivatizations across the USAR

MI force to meet the requirements. Two factors contributed to this dilemma: first, the requested MOSes and usually the grades were always the same, and second, the one-time PSRC cap limited soldiers from deploying multiple times.<sup>5</sup> Although the cumulative requirements list (table 6) contains thirty-two MOSes, the constant requirement involved only two skills--all source intelligence (96B, 350B, 35D) and counterintelligence (97B, 351B, 35E). Once soldiers possessing those skills deployed under a PSRC, they could not deploy again, and the available pool of soldiers was soon depleted.

In order to meet the MI requirements for subsequent increments, the USAR used a variety of Military Intelligence training funds to put soldiers on active duty tours rather than to deploy them under the PSRC. Although this increased the total contribution of the USAR MI force to the Bosnia operations, the data on these tours is embedded in the Intelligence Contributory Support database and is not readily available to support this thesis.

#### Intelligence Contributory Support

Intelligence Contributory Support (ICS) is a concept that evolved from the 1994 Secretary of Defense Memorandum "Peacetime Use of Reserve Component Intelligence Elements."<sup>6</sup>

It is managed by the Army Reserve Military Intelligence Support Element (ARMISE), a staff element of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the U.S. Army Reserve Command. By definition, ICS is "that intelligence support provided by USAR MI units or soldiers to satisfy the intelligence requirements of active component (AC) warfighters and national level intelligence agencies through direct or indirect involvement in operations or exercises."<sup>7</sup>

Originally, intelligence contributory support was intended primarily to match MI units with AC warfighters using the regional Army Reserve Intelligence Support Centers (ARISCs) as coordinators and training sites. In reality, ICS quickly became individual soldier driven, matching Military Intelligence soldiers with approved and funded intelligence projects for AC units Corps and above, Joint, and DoD intelligence agencies. ICS is measured in terms of man-years (365 days = 1 man-year) and is driven by intelligence funding. In 1994, the program started with two intelligence funds with budgets totaling \$1.7 million dollars, and executed sixteen man-years of intelligence contributory support.<sup>8</sup> In 1998, the intelligence funds had increased to ten with a budget approaching \$10 million

dollars and an end-of-year total of 195 man-years executed (table 11).

Four major intelligence funds drive intelligence contributory support. The two original funds are the Defense Intelligence Reserve Program (DIRP) and the General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP). Both of these funds are congressionally mandated programs that provide funds for RC support to AC intelligence requirements.<sup>9</sup> The Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP) uses reimbursable AC funds for RC support to unified commands.<sup>10</sup> And finally, the Fund Reimbursable Authority (FRA) allows AC and DoD agencies to transfer funds to the RC for intelligence support.<sup>11</sup> Of all the funds, only the Defense Intelligence Reserve Program allows AC units at Corps and below to compete for funding. The remaining programs focus on Joint and national level intelligence requirements funding.

USAR MI soldiers who participate in intelligence contributory support projects come from all USAR categories. Increasingly, Joint and national level agencies use project funds to extend training days for USAR MI soldiers already assigned or attached to their organizations. These include IMA, DIMA, and JRU soldiers as well as soldiers assigned to MI TDA units. Although the

ARMISE maintains data on the individual soldiers performing intelligence contributory support, that data was not readily available for this thesis. The individual numbers for FY95 and FY96 provided on the ICS graph (figure 5) represent gross individual contribution. The numbers do not indicate how many soldiers performed multiple tours. The bottom line, however, is that individual soldiers perform intelligence contributory support and the number of soldiers performing intelligence contributory support increases as funding increases.

#### Force Structure

Force structure, according to FM 100-11, is the "composition, by number and type of organizations, of the current, planned, or programmed" force.<sup>12</sup> The effectiveness of force structure is measured by how well it supports the mission--the mission of its assigned component, the mission of its branch, the mission of the Army, and ultimately the National Security Strategy.

A measure of the competency of the USAR MI force is reflected in the alignment and employment of each of its component parts. The USAR MI force is small. It comprises only 3 percent of the total USAR Ready Reserve and only 3 percent of the USAR Selected Reserve. Of that force, over

half (52 percent) is in the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). As a force, the IRR has no designated alignment and exists as a manpower pool to meet the Title X USAR requirement to provide "trained and ready individual soldiers to augment the Army."<sup>13</sup>

With 52 percent of the total USAR MI force in the IRR, the remaining 48 percent of the force carries a significant load. The IMA force, which includes DIMA and JRU soldiers, is an individual force, but is associated with organizational structure. The mobilization documents MI IMA soldiers are aligned against are typically Department of the Army, Joint, or Department of Defense organizations. The specific positions designated for fill by USAR MI soldiers are chosen by the supported organization, not by the USAR, and typically require field grade officers, warrant officers, and senior NCOs. Relative to the other components of the USAR MI force, the MI IMA force is larger, comprising 10 percent of the total IMA force. Unfortunately, IMA endstrength is tied directly to funding and is currently capped at 8,000 spaces, of which 749 are MI positions. The possibility of expanding the IMA force in the future is negligible.



The MI TPUs comprise 39 percent of the total USAR MI force. They support the USAR Title X mission to provide "trained and ready combat support/combat service support units to rapidly mobilize and deploy."<sup>14</sup> A small portion of the MI TPU structure (742 spaces) is composed of MI Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) units. These MI TPUs are small specialized units and are generally top heavy with MI officers and senior MI NCOs. They are all strategically force aligned, and they are all consistently ready.

The remainder of the USAR MI TPU force is composed of Modification Table of Organization and Allowance (MTOE) units--MI TPUs. This force drives the rest of the USAR MI force. The turmoil in this force causes turmoil in the rest of the force; the perceptions by which this force is judged are also the perceptions by which the rest of the USAR MI force is judged. From FY91 to FY00, the USAR MI MTOE force lost approximately 6,593 spaces. That is a 70 percent loss of structure in almost ten years. Although not all the space loss occurred after 1995, the 1995 RC MI FDU marked the turning point and perhaps the final downturn.

Chapter 4 discussed the RC MI FDU in detail and explained how the Total Army Analysis process affected the force created by the FDU. As the final evaluation criteria and the link to thesis conclusions, it is necessary to reevaluate the effect of the RC MI FDU on the USAR MI force structure. The RC MI FDU evolved from and was ultimately built on the criteria established by the RC MI Relook.<sup>15</sup> Three of those criteria impact the competency of the USAR MI MTOE force: force alignment, force mission, and force soldiers. The RC MI Relook recommended the redesigned RC force be an echelons above corps (EAC) force.<sup>16</sup> The RC MI FDU complied. The RC MI FDU inactivated the five Tactical Exploitation Battalions (TEBs), all corps aligned, and replaced them with two Corps Support Battalions. With the exception of those two battalions, the USAR TPU force today is an echelons above corps force aligned to the two Major Theaters of War (MTWs).

The RC MI Relook recommended that the new and separate USAR MI force be built to "support peacetime, contingency, crisis, and wartime operations."<sup>17</sup> In 1995, this was not a radical concept. It reflected the realities of the Army's growing involvement in peacetime and contingency operations, and complied with the concepts outlined in the

Secretary of Defense memorandum "Peacetime Use of Reserve Component Intelligence Elements."<sup>18</sup> But in 1995, the Total Army Analysis process established requirements and validated structure to support wartime operations, not contingency operations. It was not until TAA-07 that validation of MTOE structure broadened to include other than wartime operations. In the USAR MI community, however, this concept took hold quickly. The USAR MI force today accepts peacetime engagement as a valid force mission. And the enormous growth in the Intelligence Contributory Support program supports that acceptance, not only in the USAR MI community, but also in the active component, joint, and national level intelligence communities.

The RC MI Relook recommended that the new USAR MI structure be built to "capitalize on the readiness and talents of the RC MI soldier."<sup>19</sup> Again, the RC MI FDU complied, and the new USAR MI MTOE structure was built in part to capitalize on the skills of USAR MI soldiers. This was a radical concept. MTOE structure is built based on doctrine to perform a specific wartime mission. The Total Army Analysis process validates the structure based on a wartime requirement and resources that structure to the AC,

the ARNG, or the USAR. MTOE structure, therefore, is doctrine based and missions oriented. The significance of this to the USAR MI force was not necessarily in building the new structure, but in openly suggesting that MTOE structure should be built to capitalize on existing soldier skills. Like the expanded USAR MTOE force mission discussed previously, the USAR MI community quickly embraced the idea. (In fact, this concept reinforces a long held grass-roots perception that unit structure exists to keep soldiers in the force.) And, the fact that the intelligence contributory support program is dominated by individual soldier support rather than unit support indicates that the active component, Joint, and national level intelligence communities also recognize the value of individual MI soldier skills.

#### Trends

Active Component reliance on the USAR MI force for contingency support is as individual backfill, not unit replacement. Under PSRC rules, TPU soldiers are the most easily accessible, but early depletion of that source has forced a solution that is rapidly becoming the norm. Increasingly, individual soldiers are performing extended active duty tours in support of contingency operations

using specially designated intelligence funds. In effect, contingency support is becoming intelligence contributory support. Additionally, the individual requirements or filler support requested by the AC has focused on two basic MI skills: all source intelligence and counterintelligence.

Intelligence Contributory Support is predominately individual MI soldier support to Corps, EAC, joint and national level agencies. The only warfighter support is at Corps and EAC level, but proportionally that support is far less than what goes to joint and national level. The system fosters this situation by making increased funding available at those levels. The near 100 percent execution rates and the average length of most intelligence contributory support tours (in excess of fourteen days) indicate that the USAR MI force is both accessible and capable of meeting the requirements.

Structurally, the USAR MI MTOE force has become a filler force. Initially, in TAA-05, a significant portion of the modular USAR MI structure was embedded in the structure of the AC MI units. That gave the USAR MI structure validity by tying it to a structure with a valid allocation rule. At the same time, however, it made the USAR MI structure dependent upon the AC MI structure.

Force alignment of USAR MI MTOE units has placed the force within the sphere of units and organizations that have enormous access to intelligence contributory support funds and an appetite for individual support and augmentation.

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<sup>1</sup>Department of the Army, Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, Military Intelligence Personnel System Staff Officer, "Always Out Front" (briefing slides, Washington, DC: OCAR, 1999), 10.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., 4.

<sup>4</sup>Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, "Units Deployed" (spreadsheet, Washington, DC: DA, 1999).

<sup>5</sup>George Sengelaub, "Information on Contingency Operations," e-mail to the author, 10 February 1999.

<sup>6</sup>Department of Defense, "Peacetime Use of Reserve Component Intelligence Elements" (Washington, DC: OSD, 1994).

<sup>7</sup>Department of the Army, U.S. Army Reserve Command, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, "Memorandum of Instruction (MOI) for Intelligence Contributory Support Project Funds Execution - FY98" (Atlanta: USARC, 1997).

<sup>8</sup>Department of the Army, U.S. Army Reserve Command, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, "USARC DCSINT Tasker for OCAR Quadrennial Defense Review" (spreadsheet, Atlanta: USARC, 1997).

<sup>9</sup>Department of the Army, U.S. Army Reserve Command, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, "Memorandum of Instruction (MOI) for Intelligence Contributory Support Project Funds Execution - FY98" (Atlanta: USARC, 1997).

<sup>10</sup>Ibid.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid.

<sup>12</sup>Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-11, *Force Integration* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1998), 6-5.

<sup>13</sup>Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Reserve Component Programs* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1998), 2.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid.

<sup>15</sup>Report with enclosure (Draft Concept Plan, Intelligence and Security Command, DA; Force Design and Stationing Concept, 18 October 1993), referenced in U.S. Department of the Army, U.S. Army Reserve Command, Office of the Command Historian, *U.S. Army Reserve Command Annual Command History 1 January to 31 December 1995* (Atlanta, GA: GPO, 1997), 279.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid.

<sup>17</sup>Report with enclosure (Draft Concept Plan, Intelligence and Security Command, DA; Force Design and Stationing Concept, 18 October 1993), referenced in U.S. Department of the Army, U.S. Army Reserve Command, Office of the Command Historian, *U.S. Army Reserve Command Annual Command History 1 January to 31 December 1995* (Atlanta, GA: GPO, 1997), 279.

<sup>18</sup>Department of Defense, "Peacetime Use of Reserve Component Intelligence Elements" (Washington, DC: OSD, 1994).

<sup>19</sup>Report with enclosure (Draft Concept Plan, Intelligence and Security Command, DA; Force Design and Stationing Concept, 18 Oct 93), referenced in U.S. Department of the Army, U.S. Army Reserve Command, Office of the Command Historian, *U.S. Army Reserve Command Annual Command History 1 January to 31 December 1995* (Atlanta, GA: GPO, 1997), 279.



## CHAPTER 6

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### The Thesis Question

Turbulence in the force, a 70 percent reduction in TPU structure, and increasing operational tempo all added to the perception that the true strength of the USAR MI force is not in its units, but in its individual soldiers. To confirm or dispel that perception, the primary thesis question asked: Is the core competency of the USAR MI force based in TPUs or in individual soldier support? To answer that question, the thesis examined the USAR MI force in all its various forms. It evaluated its structure, delved into its past, explored the forces that shaped it and that continue to shape it, and examined what it does to support the total Army. Based on that examination, the answer to the primary research question is yes; in this case, perception is reality.

What the USAR MI force does best is individual soldier support. The strength of the USAR MI force is not in its size; it does not have the spaces to dominate in either its component or its branch. Its greatest strength is its ability to respond to the increasing demands of army, joint, and national level agencies for intelligence

contributory support and contingency support. In the last six years, the USAR MI force has executed 575 man-years in intelligence contributory support (figure 5) and deployed almost 700 soldiers in support of operations Joint Endeavor, Joint Guard, and Joint Forge (table 6). In the last six years, the USAR MI force has responded individually, not as units, and it is this capability that forms the core competency of the force. The answers to the secondary thesis questions demonstrate the extent of that capability, how the USAR MI force has evolved to respond to peacetime and contingency requirements, and how this competency impacts the USAR MI force structure.

#### The Secondary Thesis Questions

Chapter 1 of this thesis asked the primary thesis question and proposed to answer it using a series of secondary questions. Those questions were answered in the preceding chapters and are summarized in the following paragraphs as a prelude to the final conclusions.

The first of the secondary thesis questions established a baseline by asking: How is the USAR MI force organized? The USAR MI force is a small force, comprising only 3 percent of the USAR Ready Reserve. Of that force, over 50 percent are IRR soldiers, approximately 40 percent

are in troop units, and the remaining 7 percent are IMA soldiers. Between FY91 and FY00 the MTOE force lost over 70 percent of its spaces in a gradual downhill slide that gained momentum after the 1995 RC MI FDU. While the MTOE force lost spaces, the TDA force remained constant, and in 1998 increased its strength as the MIDs converted from MTOE to TDA and the JRUs activated. By FY00, the MTOE force will have only 2,581 spaces, while the TDA and IMA forces will have approximately 700 spaces each. Although this thesis has consistently attributed the loss of spaces to the USAR MI force as a whole, the space loss has in fact been almost exclusively in the MTOE force. The rest of the USAR MI force, a predominately individual force, has not lost spaces. More importantly, the TDA and IMA MI forces appear to be growing closer. Although the TDA force is unit based, it shares many similarities with the IMA force. Both are associated with organizational structure (TDA, MOBTDA), both are rank heavy and specialized, and both are aligned to Army, Joint, or national level intelligence agencies where they actively contribute to ongoing intelligence operations.

The RC MI FDU lies at the core of the secondary thesis question: How has the USAR MI force evolved? The

significance of the RC MI FDU lies not in the accelerated loss of spaces that followed its implementation, but rather in the fundamental conceptual changes in the structure, mission, and employment of the USAR MI MTOE force. The RC MI FDU split the Military Intelligence force. No longer a single MTOE force resourced among the different components, the MI force suddenly became an AC force and an RC force. In terms of Total Army Analysis, the new RC MI FDU structure broke all the rules. Unsupported by doctrine, and organized modularly, the new structure survived TAA-05 in part as embedded structure in existing AC structure. To the force development community, this was a clear indication that the new USAR MI MTOE structure could not stand on its own. To survive Total Army Analysis, it became a filler force.

Conceptually, the RC MI FDU force was built to "capitalize on the readiness and talents of the RC MI soldier" and to use those strengths to support not only wartime, but also peacetime and contingency operations.<sup>1</sup> This, too, broke all the rules. An MTOE force is based on structure built to support a warfight. But this new USAR structure was built based on soldiers who would support not only the warfight, but also peacetime and contingency

operations. These are characteristics of a TDA force, not an MTOE force.

Peacetime engagement is the focus of the final two secondary thesis questions: What is the USAR MI force doing now, and how do individual MI skills support what the force is doing? Despite its size, the USAR MI force is actively engaged in peacetime and contingency operations. A predominately MTOE MI force has supported seven Bosnia rotations. Although most of that support came from MTOE TPU soldiers, those soldiers were mobilized and deployed to answer individual requirements. They also were not deployed to Bosnia, but deployed instead to Germany where they backfilled AC MI soldiers. The USAR MI force support to contingency operations, therefore, has been individual soldiers extracted from MI TPUs and deployed and employed as fillers for the active component.

Intelligence contributory support taps the USAR MI force across all categories--TPU, IMA, and IRR. It is based almost exclusively on individual MI soldier support, and is limited only by the amount of funding available. Since its inception in 1994, the program has grown at a phenomenal rate, demonstrating the ability of the USAR MI force to support a myriad of intelligence projects, most of

them in excess of the normal 14-day annual training requirement. Fueled by funding and biased by the customer base allowed to compete for that funding, intelligence contributory support projects have been predominately in support of Army level, joint, and national intelligence agencies. Intelligence contributory support, therefore, is a program that focuses the individual USAR MI force on operational and strategic intelligence. The success of the intelligence contributory support program has in effect created an individual USAR MI force with a mission of maximum peacetime engagement focused on operational and strategic intelligence. The intelligence contributory support leveraged individual military intelligence skills and soldiers in support of peacetime intelligence requirements and focused the force on operational and strategic level intelligence.

#### Conclusions

It is simplistic to say that the core competency of the USAR MI force is the individual MI soldier. That is only part of the truth. In fact, the core competency is based in individual MI soldier support. That means an individually focused force, but not necessarily an individual force. The research indicates that soldiers who

are associated with some type of organizational structure contribute more proportionally than do soldiers in the unassigned manpower pool called the IRR. Organizational structure includes augmentation and mobilization TDAs, MI TPU TDAs, and MTOE TPUs. The soldiers assigned to these structures therefore include IMA, DIMA, and JRU soldiers. An organizational structure in effect nurtures and protects MI soldiers. It provides training missions, training days, and training funding that IRR soldiers normally do not receive.

Over the last few years, the USAR MI force has seemed to be more adrift than steered by a master plan. Determining the direction of the drift has been the purpose of this thesis. Understanding the implications of that drift on the future of the USAR MI force is the purpose of the thesis recommendations. Individual soldier support and peacetime engagement are the strengths of the USAR MI force. Several times, this thesis has asserted that the USAR MI MTOE force drives the rest of the USAR MI force, that the fate of the MTOE force ultimately determines the fate of the rest of the MI force. But is that really the truth or is it only perception?

This thesis demonstrated that the turmoil in the USAR MI force has really been turmoil in the USAR MI MTOE force. It is the MTOE force that lost over 6,500 spaces in ten years. The TDA force actually gained spaces. The drift in the structure of the USAR MI force therefore has been in the direction of not only a smaller force, but also an individually based force. For the purposes of this thesis, an individually based force emphasizes individual skills and competency over structure, employs soldiers in direct or indirect support of real world intelligence requirements and focuses on operational and strategic level intelligence support. An individually based force includes IRR soldiers, IMA, DIMA, and JRU soldiers, and MI TDA units. The drift in the USAR MI force has in reality been a drift in the USAR MI MTOE force. Not only has it drifted towards smaller structure, but the cumulative effects of the RC MI Relook, the memorandum "Peacetime Use of Reserve Component Intelligence Elements" and the RC MI FDU has shifted the focus of the MTOE force from structure oriented to soldier oriented; from wartime mission oriented to peacetime engagement oriented; and from tactically oriented to operationally and strategically oriented.



Now, back to the previous question. Does the MTOE force drive the rest of the force? In the USAR MI MTOE force, the answer is no; the rest of USAR MI force has not been noticeably affected by the turmoil in the MTOE force. Does the fate of the MTOE force affect the fate of the rest of the force? Probably. The fate of the rest of the USAR MI force rests upon the ability of the USAR MI community to recognize that the structure, mission, and focus of the current USAR MI MTOE force no longer meets the definition of MTOE structure. It has drifted and taken on characteristics of an individually based force; the USAR MI MTOE force is in effect a TDA force masquerading as MTOE. How the USAR MI community deals with the MI MTOE force in the future will ultimately affect the rest of the USAR MI force.

#### Recommendations

The USAR MI community can take one of two paths as it looks to shape the future USAR MI force. The first path recommitts the USAR to MI MTOE structure that is built by doctrine, validated by TAA, and fully integrated into a single Army MI force. The second path reaffirms the USAR's commitment to the spirit of the RC MI FDU and the demonstrated competency of the USAR MI force, and seeks a

structure that will most effectively maximize those strengths.

#### A Viable MTOE Force

Chances are that the USAR will recommit to MI MTOE structure. This path does not maximize the core competency of the USAR MI force but reflects the reality of the MTOE driven USAR force. The challenge for the USAR MI community is in not maintaining the status quo by clinging to the RC MI FDU structure. A viable MI MTOE force is one that can play by the rules; it is not one that is created out-of-cycle and force-fed to the larger MI community. A viable USAR MI MTOE force is one that is an integral part of a single MI force. It is a force that is built based on doctrine to meet specific wartime or contingency missions. A viable USAR MI MTOE force is a structure based, mission oriented force; it is not a holding structure for a manpower pool of valuable MI skills. Other structures--TDA, IMA, JRU--and other USAR categories--the IRR--exist for those purposes.

The MI community as a whole has been in a holding pattern for the last two years, waiting for the results of the Intelligence XXI study with the hope that out of that study will come a significant MI force restructure. In

October 1998, a TRADOC briefing on TAA-07 allocation rules summed up the status of the current MI force:

"Consolidation of the Army's MI community will, over time, improve MI's overall structure. The Army has attempted to "streamline" the structure through two MI sponsored FDUs, one AC and one RC. The results were approved, but continued emphasis on MI restructuring indicates the FDUs were unsuccessful."<sup>2</sup>

When the restructure comes, the USAR MI community must be willing to stand up and accept responsibility for a part of that structure. That may not, however, be as easy as it sounds. It is possible that the AC MI community would prefer to use the USAR MI force as a filler force, giving it bits and pieces of MI structure rather than ownership of TAA validated units. (Beware the "filler force" mentality!) It is also possible that the USAR MI force may not be capable of resourcing ready MI MTOE units. The pre-RC MI FDU MTOE force, with some exceptions, was historically never ready. In the current space restrained, endstrength limited USAR force, no branch can afford to resource unready structure.

## No MTOE Force

A second path for the USAR MI community is to eliminate MTOE structure and to shift the MI force into smaller, more specialized TDA and IMA structure. This will be a difficult decision. It will require USAR leadership to accept that the core competency of the USAR MI force is in individual soldier support and that MTOE structure does not maximize that competency. TDA structure, unprotected by Total Army Analysis and vulnerable to space reductions, has always been considered a risky place to concentrate a force. But in the USAR MI force, that perception is clearly untrue. (Remember, in the last ten years, it was the MTOE force that lost over 6,500 spaces, and the TDA force that gained spaces.) Ultimately, a viable and productive TDA force will justify its own existence.

The Military Intelligence infrastructure in the USAR is uniquely positioned and well qualified to support a TDA and IMA MI force. The Army Reserve Military Intelligence Support Element (ARMISE) is by far the most powerful support structure in the USAR. The ARMISE operates the Intelligence Contributory Support program, managing and distributing intelligence funds, and matching qualified soldiers with funded intelligence contributory support

projects. The power of intelligence funds is in their ability to expand intelligence training for selected sets of soldiers. This is happening now with some of the Military Intelligence Detachments. Intelligence funds resource projects that MIDs soldiers work during their drills. The additional funding allows MIDs soldiers, on a voluntary basis, to work the project in increased drill segments or more intensively on active duty tours. Intelligence funds surge training for individual soldiers, and have the potential to surge minimal force structure--IMAs, Augmentation Detachments, even Reinforcement Training Units (RTUs)--into funded force structure for short periods of time. Unlike the limited funds distributed to MTOE units for support and training, intelligence funds target the core competency of the USAR MI force - intelligence funds for intelligence soldiers for maximum peacetime intelligence training and engagement. The ARMISE is the tool the USAR MI force can use to make it happen.

#### Future Research

The intent of this thesis was to examine and evaluate the USAR MI force across its organizational categories. Despite that intent, the end result is more a broad overview than an in-depth categorical analysis of the

force. Partly, this is due to constraints imposed on the thesis initially, and partly this is due to gaps in the research data because of both availability and time. This thesis then should be considered a starting point for further research. Three areas merit closer examination: (1) MTOE units, (2) the IRR, and (3) alternative structure.

In seeking to evaluate the core competency of the USAR MI force, this thesis focused more on individual soldiers from MI MTOE units than it did on the MTOE units themselves. Future research in support of this thesis should focus on military intelligence training in USAR MI MTOE units. Principally, how much military intelligence training do soldiers in TPUs actually do? How much of that training is done in the unit, and how much is done at offsite training facilities; how much is done directly in support of the unit's designated AC wartrace, and how much is done in support of units or agencies to which the unit is not wartime aligned? Research should also analyze the reasons behind low MOS qualification rates and high enlisted attrition rates.

The Individual Ready Reserve is the USAR's individual pool of unassigned manpower, and with 415,612 soldiers assigned, it represents 68 percent of the USAR Ready

Reserve.<sup>3</sup> Because of the limited data available, this thesis was not able to analyze the IRR as a category to the depth originally intended. Future research could shed significant light on both the capabilities and limitations of this manpower pool from a USAR MI force perspective. Specifically, what is the grade and MOS mix of this force, and in an average year, how many days of training do MI officers, warrant officers, and enlisted soldiers actually perform? Also, how much and for whom do MI IRR soldiers perform intelligence contributory support? A common perception of the IRR force is that the soldiers in this category do very little training, and by the end of two years in the IRR their skills have degraded significantly. Confirming or dispelling that perception is a critical subject for future research.

Finally, as an adjunct to the recommendations in this thesis, a topic of future research could explore alternative structure for the MI MTOE force. One of the recommendations of this thesis is that the MI MTOE force be converted to TDA structure. What that structure would look like and what units and agencies it would best support make an excellent primary question for another thesis. Unlike MTOE structure, TDA structure is not standardized. It is

built based on the specific needs of the supported unit or agency. With the exception of the Military Intelligence Detachments, no MI TDA units look the same. A thesis on this topic would explore which units and agencies the USAR MI TDA force could support and how they should be built. An innovative approach to this topic would examine how other USAR branches have dealt, structurally, with unique capabilities or niche skills not compatible with MTOE structure.

### Conclusion

The conclusion that the core competency of the USAR MI force is based in individual soldier support confirms the perception that prompted this thesis. In hindsight, it is a conclusion that was reached initially in 1992 with the recommendations of the RC MI Relook and it has driven the USAR MI force ever since. The RC MI FDU was both a blessing and a curse to the USAR MI force. It recognized the unique skills and capabilities of individual Military Intelligence soldiers and created a structure to make those capabilities available to the active component through easily accessible, modular teams. But in trying to create an MTOE structure to accommodate those competencies, the RC MI FDU failed to understand the nature of the MTOE



structure and the rigid, rules driven system that validates it. For the USAR MI TPU force the consequences of that decision were devastating. The structure it created may not survive, but the spirit of the RC MI FDU lives on through intelligence contributory support missions and contingency support. The challenge for USAR MI leadership in shaping the future MI force is in recognizing that the true strength of the USAR MI force derives from its soldiers and not from the MTOE structure. As long as USAR MI soldiers exist, the USAR MI force will exist.

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<sup>1</sup>Report with enclosure (Draft Concept Plan, Intelligence and Security Command, DA; Force Design and Stationing Concept, 18 Oct 93), referenced in U.S. Department of the Army, U.S. Army Reserve Command, Office of the Command Historian, "U.S. Army Reserve Command Annual Command History 1 January to 31 December 1995" (Atlanta, GA: GPO, 1997), 279.

<sup>2</sup>Department of the Army, Training and Doctrine Command, Force Design Directorate, "TRADOC Prepares for TAA-07" (briefing slides, TRADOC, 1997), 18.

<sup>3</sup>Department of the Army, Office, Chief Army Reserve, Military Intelligence Personnel System Staff Officer, "Always Out Front" (briefing slides, Washington, DC: OCAR, 1999), 12.

# FIGURES




Figure 1. USAR MI Reductions. Source: U.S. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, "USAR Force Structure" (briefing slides, Washington, DC: OCAR, 1998), 24; and U.S. Department of the Army, U.S. Army Reserve Directorate of Force Programs, "USAR MI Force Structure Laydown" (briefing slides, Atlanta: USARC, 1999), 50.

U.S. Army Reserve					1,080,683	
Ready Reserve				415,612	Standby Reserve	Retired Reserve
Selected Reserve			206,185	IRR	739	664,332
Paid drill strength	AGR	IMA	IRR			
TPU						
180,246	11,755	7,126	216,485			
Troop Program Unit	Active/Guard Reserve	Individual Mobilization Augmentee	Individual Ready Reserve			

Figure 2. Categories of the USAR. Source: U.S. Department of the Army, Office, Chief Army Reserve, Military Intelligence Personnel System Staff Officer, "Always Out Front" (briefing slides, Washington, DC: OCAR, 1999), 12.




Figure 3. USAR MI Units by Assigned Strength and MOSQ. Source: U.S. Department of the Army, Office, Chief Army Reserve, Military Intelligence Personnel System Staff Officer, "Always Out Front" (briefing slides, Washington, DC: OCAR, 1999), 13-14.




Figure 4. USAR MI TPU Attrition Rates. Source: U.S. Department of the Army, Office, Chief Army Reserve, Military Intelligence Personnel System Staff Officer, "Always Out Front" (briefing slides, Washington, DC: OCAR, 1999), 26.




Figure 5. Intelligence Contributory Support by man-years for the years 1994 to 1999. Source: U.S. Department of the Army, U.S. Army Reserve Command, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, "Intelligence Contributory Support FY 94-99" (chart, Atlanta: USARC, 1999).

# TABLES

Table 1. USAR Category Authorizations

	TPU	IMA	DIMA	JRU	IRR-AUG
Req/Auth	180,246	6,610	1,390	660	2,854
Mobiliza- tion	PSRC	PSRC	PSRC	PSRC	Partial
Positions	Assigned USAR MTOE/TDA	Assigned DoD/AC MOBTDA	Assigned DoD/AC MOBTDA	Assigned CINC MOBTDA	Attached DoD/AC MOBTDA
AT	12-17 Days	12 Days	12 Days	12-17 Days	12 Days
IDT	48 Drills	None	24-48 Drills	48 Drills	None

Source: U.S. Department of the Army, Army Reserve Personnel Command, "Mobilization Augmentee Programs At A Glance" [briefing online] (St. Louis: AR-PERSCOM, 1998, accessed 10 January 1999), available from <http://www.army.mil/usar/ar-perscom/imaglan.htm>.

Table 2. Criteria for a RC MI Redesign

1	Be based on requirements rather than on equipment shortages or RC structure
2	Be modeled on successes demonstrated from experience
3	Provide the Army a dependable RC MI core capability
4	Provide the total force with a "real, value-added utility in accomplishing the MI mission"
5	Ensure that the AC and RC are interoperable forces
6	Be affordable
7	Leverage RC strengths to support peacetime, contingency, crisis, and wartime operations
8	Capitalize on the readiness and talents of the RC MI soldier
9	Maximize the use of existing resources and facilities
10	Be accessible to support MI requirements in and outside the usual mobilization windows

Source: Department of the Army, Office of the Command Historian, *U.S. Army Reserve Command Annual History 1 January to 31 December 1995*. (Atlanta: USARC, 1997).



Table 3. Pre-RC MI FDU MI MTOE Force

<i>Unit</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Strength</i>
HHC, 319th MI Bde (EAC)	Ft. Lewis, WA	101
373rd MI Bn (TEB)	Oakland, CA	259
337th MI Bn (TEB) (ABN)	Charlotte, NC	420
301st MI Bn (TEB)	Pasadena, TX	259
338th MI Bn (TEB)	Ft. Meade, MD	427
314th MI Bn (TEB)	Detroit, MI	427
272nd MI Co (Linguist)	Bell, CA	77
283rd MI Co (Linguist)	Ft. Snelling, MN	77
900th MI Co (Linguist)	Austin, TX	77
906th MI Co (Linguist)	Detroit, MI	77
265th MI Co (Linguist)	Bristol, PA	77
351st MI Co (Linguist)	Olathe, KS	77
356th MI Co (Linguist)	Forest Park, GA	77
368th MI Co (Linguist)	Ft. Shafter, HI	78
197th MI Det (TAREX)	Ft. Meade, MD	21
1st MI Center (EAC)	Phoenix, AZ	121
372nd MI Co (TECHINT)	Ft. Devens, MA	93
383rd MI Co (TECHINT)	Ft. Devens, MA	93
338th MI Co (I&E)	Waterbury, CT	51
651st MI Co (I&E)	Pasadena, CA	51
337th MI Co (I&E)	Danbury, CT	116
399th MI Co (I&E)	St. Louis, MO	116
138th MI Co (AE)	Orlando, FL	152
24th MI Bn (IA)	Staten Island, NY	256
211th MI Co (CI)	Bronx, NY	93
406th MI Co (CI)	Mesa, AZ	94
214th MI Co (CI)	Owings Mills, MD	94
	<i>Total:</i>	<i>3861</i>

Source: U.S. Department of the Army, U.S. Army Reserve Command, Deputy Chief of Staff for Force Development, SRC 34 Military Intelligence Master Force File (Atlanta: USARC, 1998)

Table 4. USAR Categories

	Ready Reserve			
	Selected Reserve			
	TPU	AGR	IMA	IRR
Total	180,246	11,755	7,126	216,485
MI	4,109	215	749	5,408
Percent	2%	2%	11%	2%

Source: U.S. Department of the Army, Office, Chief Army Reserve, Military Intelligence Personnel System Staff Officer, "Always Out Front" (briefing slides, Washington, DC: OCAR, 1999), 12.

Table 5. MI MOSes Scheduled to be Trained in FY99

35D	All Source Intelligence Officer
35E	Counterintelligence Officer
35G	Signals Intelligence/Electronic Warfare Officer
96B	Intelligence Analyst
96D	Imagery Analyst
96R	Ground Surveillance Systems Operator
97B	Counterintelligence Agent
97E	Interrogator
97L	Translator/Interpreter
98C	Signals Intelligence Analyst
98G	Voice Interceptor
98J	Electronic Intelligence Interceptor/Locator

Source: U.S. Department of the Army, U.S. Army Reserve Command, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, "TY99 MI Training Courses" (spreadsheet, Atlanta: USARC, 1999); and U.S. Department of the Army, U.S. Army Reserve Command, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, "TY97 and 98 MI Training Courses" (spreadsheet, Atlanta: USARC, 1999).

Table 6. USAR Support to Operations Joint Endeavor  
Joint Guard and Joint Forge

MOS/AOC	Total MI TPU Mobilized	AR-PERSCOM (IMA, IRR) Mobilized	Total Soldiers Mobilized	Percent TPU Soldiers Mobilized
96B	228	9	237	96%
96D	25	0	25	100%
96H	0	0	0	
96R	0	0	0	
97B	173	1	174	99%
97E	14	2	16	88%
97G	18	0	18	100%
97L	0	0	0	
97X	5	0	5	100%
98C	34	1	35	97%
98D	4	0	4	100%
98G	18	0	18	100%
98H	0	0	0	
98J	15	0	15	100%
98K	0	0	0	
98Z	1	0	1	100%
350B	24	0	24	100%
350D	3	0	3	100%
351B	24	1	25	96%
351E	3	0	3	100%
351C	0	0	0	
351X	3	2	5	60%
352C	3	0	3	100%
352G	4	0	4	100%
352J	2	0	2	100%
353A	0	0	0	
35B	3	1	4	75%
35C	0	0	0	
35D	35	14	49	71%
35E	24	1	25	96%
35F	1	0	1	100%
35G	2	0	2	100%
Total	666	32	698	95%

Source: U.S. Department of the Army, U.S. Army Reserve Command, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, "MI MOB Report" (spreadsheet, Atlanta: USARC, 1999).

Table 7. Force Alignment of USAR MI TPU Force

Total Army Analysis Alignment	MTOE	TDA	Total
Strategic/Joint/Defense <b>(22%)</b>			<b>742</b>
1 x AIC Det (ACOM)		83	
1 x USAREUR Det		57	
8 x PACOM JRUs		223	
1 x EUCOM JRU		11	
1 x TCAE Aug Det (Army TCAE/NSA)		35	
21 x MI Dets (DIA)		189	
16 x MI Dets (NGIC)		144	
Theater Support (INSCOM) <b>(37%)</b>			<b>1246</b>
345 MI Bn (Theater Support)	328		
323 MI Bn (Theater Exploitation)	294		
368 MI Bn (Theater Support)	450		
418 MI Det (Imagery)	47		
331 MI Co (Imagery)	127		
General Support (INSCOM) <b>(5%)</b>			<b>168</b>
383 MI Co (Techint)	101		
372 MI Co (Techint)	67		
General Support (Linguist) <b>(16%)</b>			<b>526</b>
8 x Ling Co	448		
1 x Ling Co	78		
Corps Support <b>(19%)</b>			<b>641</b>
325 MI Bn (Corps Support)	354		
321 MI Bn (Corps Support)	287		
Total:	2581	742	<b>3323</b>

Source: U.S. Department of the Army, U.S. Army Reserve Directorate of Force Programs, "USAR MI Force Structure Laydown" (briefing slides, Atlanta: USARC, 1999), 50.

Table 8. Distribution of the USAR MI Force by Category and MOS

AOC/MOS Description	* MI MTOE			** TPU			AGR			MIA			IRK			Grand Total		
	Auth	Asgn	Qual	Auth	Asgn	Qual	Auth	Asgn	%Asgn	Auth	Asgn	%Asgn	Auth	Asgn	%Asgn	Auth	Asgn	%Asgn
35B Strategic Intelligence	14	205	193	151	94%	78%	3	5	167%	96	96	100%	49	49	100%	353	343	97%
35C Imagery Intelligence (IMINT)	28	24	22	14	92%	64%	1	4	400%	28	28	100%	50	50	100%	103	104	101%
35D All Source Intelligence	176	607	623	449	103%	72%	51	109	214%	254	254	100%	1564	1564	100%	2476	2550	103%
35E Counterintelligence (CI)	62	95	110	71	116%	65%	1	31	3100%	54	54	100%	145	145	100%	285	340	115%
35F Human Intelligence (HUMINT)	8	13	7	5	54%	71%	0	1	0%	40	40	100%	9	9	100%	62	57	92%
35G Signals Intelligence/Electronic Warfare	16	29	22	18	76%	82%	9	19	211%	53	53	100%	86	86	100%	177	180	102%
<b>Officer Total</b>	<b>250</b>	<b>973</b>	<b>977</b>	<b>708</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>72%</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>169</b>	<b>260%</b>	<b>628</b>	<b>628</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>1903</b>	<b>1903</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>3466</b>	<b>3674</b>	<b>103%</b>
350B All Source Intelligence Tech	16	72	83	74	115%	89%	11	9	82%	14	14	100%	13	13	100%	110	119	108%
350D Imagery Intelligence Tech	24	29	15	12	52%	80%	3	4	133%	9	9	100%	7	7	100%	48	35	73%
351B Counterintelligence Tech	39	60	97	79	162%	81%	7	9	129%	24	24	100%	41	41	100%	132	171	130%
351C Area Intelligence Tech	6	5	4	3	80%	75%	0	2	0%	2	2	100%	0	0	0%	7	7	100%
351E Interrogation Tech	21	29	41	23	141%	56%	8	10	125%	4	4	100%	13	13	100%	54	68	126%
352C Traffic Analysis Tech	32	37	31	20	84%	85%	9	8	89%	2	2	100%	15	15	100%	63	56	89%
352G Voice Intercept Tech	13	13	29	14	223%	48%	7	5	71%	1	1	100%	8	8	100%	29	43	148%
352H Morse Intercept Tech	1	1	0	0	0%	0%	1	2	200%	0	0	0%	1	1	100%	3	3	100%
352J Emanations Analysis Tech	8	8	7	5	88%	71%	0	0	0%	0	0	0%	5	5	100%	13	12	92%
352K Non-Morse Intercept	0	0	0	0	0%	0%	0	0	0%	0	0	0%	1	1	100%	1	1	100%
353A LEW Equipment Tech	4	5	4	4	80%	100%	1	1	100%	0	0	0%	7	7	100%	13	12	92%
<b>Warrant Officer Total</b>	<b>162</b>	<b>289</b>	<b>311</b>	<b>234</b>	<b>120%</b>	<b>76%</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>104%</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>473</b>	<b>627</b>	<b>111%</b>
96B Intelligence Analyst	239	1221	1181	800	97%	68%	29	21	72%	86	86	100%	689	689	100%	2025	1977	98%
96D Imagery Analyst	216	230	179	105	78%	59%	6	3	50%	9	9	100%	155	155	100%	400	346	87%
96H Imagery Ground Station	0	0	0	0	0%	0%	0	0	0%	0	0	0%	36	36	100%	36	36	100%
96R Ground Surveillance Systems Operator	0	0	0	0	0%	0%	0	2	0%	0	0	0%	285	285	100%	285	287	101%
96U Unmanned Aerial Vehicle	0	0	0	0	0%	0%	0	0	0%	0	0	0%	10	10	100%	10	10	100%
96Z Intelligence Senior Sergeant	0	3	7	6	233%	86%	1	0	0%	5	5	100%	6	6	100%	15	18	120%
97B Counterintelligence Agent	281	368	496	283	135%	57%	45	21	47%	36	36	100%	300	300	100%	749	853	114%
97E Interrogator	171	340	227	153	67%	67%	3	5	167%	7	7	100%	219	219	100%	569	458	80%
97G MDCI Operator/Analyst	0	14	42	22	300%	52%	0	3	0%	4	4	100%	70	70	100%	88	119	135%
97L Translator/Interpreter	320	320	388	176	121%	45%	4	1	25%	0	0	0%	7	7	100%	331	396	120%
97C Signals Intelligence Analyst	0	1	0	0	0%	0%	0	0	0%	0	0	0%	0	0	0%	1	1	0%
98D Enabler Locator/Identification	98	121	119	82	98%	68%	4	2	50%	8	8	100%	389	389	100%	522	518	99%
98G Voice Interceptor	103	113	141	90	125%	64%	7	4	57%	4	4	100%	600	600	100%	724	749	103%
98H Communications Interceptor/Locator	14	14	7	3	50%	43%	1	4	400%	2	2	100%	136	136	100%	153	149	97%
98J Electronic Intelligence Interceptor/Analyst	77	84	97	52	115%	54%	0	2	0%	3	3	100%	225	225	100%	312	327	105%
98K Signal Collection/Identification Analyst	1	45	2	0	4%	0%	0	0	0%	1	1	100%	102	102	100%	148	105	71%
98X Electronic Warfare/Signal Analyst	0	0	0	0	0%	0%	0	0	0%	0	0	0%	105	105	100%	105	105	100%
98Z Signals Intelligence Senior Sergeant	1	3	9	9	300%	100%	3	10	333%	3	3	100%	10	10	100%	19	32	168%
<b>Enlisted Total</b>	<b>1820</b>	<b>2877</b>	<b>2896</b>	<b>1781</b>	<b>101%</b>	<b>62%</b>	<b>103</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>76%</b>	<b>168</b>	<b>168</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>3394</b>	<b>3394</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>6842</b>	<b>6836</b>	<b>100%</b>
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>1972</b>	<b>4109</b>	<b>4183</b>	<b>2723</b>	<b>102%</b>	<b>66%</b>	<b>216</b>	<b>236</b>	<b>138%</b>	<b>749</b>	<b>749</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>6408</b>	<b>6408</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>10481</b>	<b>10635</b>	<b>101%</b>

Source: U.S. Department of the Army, Office, Chief Army Reserve, Military Intelligence Personnel System Staff Officer, "Always Out Front" (Briefing slides, Washington, DC: 1999).

\* Military Intelligence soldiers in MI TPUs.

\*\* Military Intelligence soldiers in all USAR TPUs.

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
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
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